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Abstract The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely
used in different concepts and refer not only to protection
of human beings and their surrounding environment against
hazardous biological agent, but also to global disarmament
of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the biosafety
and biosecurity issues should be considered interdisci-
plinary based on multilateral agreements against
proliferation of biological weapons, public health and
environmental protection. This publication presents infor-
mation on both, international and national biosafety and
biosecurity legislation. Status of national implementation
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, penal-
ization issues and measures to account for and secure
production, use, storage of particularly dangerous patho-
gens or activities involving humans, plants and animals
where infection may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety
and security measures in laboratories have been studied.
Moreover, dual-use technology and measures of secure
transport of biohazard materials have been also taken into
account. In addition, genetic engineering regulations, bio-
security activities in laboratories and code of conducts have
been investigated, as well.
Keywords Biosafety  Biosecurity  Legislation 
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Introduction
The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely used in
different concepts and frameworks which basically include
best practices in working safely and securely with biolog-
ical agents and toxins in different workplaces and
environments.
However, biosafety and biosecurity initiatives refer not
only to protection of human beings and their surrounding
environment against hazardous biological agent, but also to
global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. As a
result, the biosafety and biosecurity issues need to be
considered interdisciplinary based on multilateral agree-
ments against proliferation of biological weapons, public
health and environmental protection.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) is a key element in the international community’s
efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The main provisions of the BTWC cover
prohibitions, implementation, protection and peaceful
usage of biological and toxin weapons (Millett 2010). The
Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and
entered into force on 26 March 1975. Currently, there are
170 States Parties, which signed and ratified the BTWC,
another 10 states have signed, but not ratified the treaty and
16 states are not members (UNOG The United Nations
Office at Geneva, Membership of Biological Weapons
Convention 2013).
In accordance with article IV of the BTWC, each State
Party shall, in agreement with its constitutional ordinance,
take activities to prohibit and prevent the development,
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production, stockpiling, acquisition of biological agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery. In
addition, article III requires all States Parties to refrain
from transferring biological weapons to anyone and from
assisting, encouraging or including anyone to produce or
acquire them. Based on this, some issues should be con-
sidered in a particular way, namely, penal measures,
biosafety and biosecurity measures, import and export
controls, enforcement measures and both, domestic and
international cooperation and assistance.
It is still difficult to balance efforts to improve public
health with efforts to counter bioterrorism despite slight/
subtle differences between natural and deliberate outbreaks
of diseases (Dembek et al. 2007; Hunger et al. 2013).
Moreover, clinical symptoms caused by biological agents
of public health concern may mimic some agents of biot-
errorism concern and vice versa. To assist State Parties in
the implementation of the article X of BTWC, an Inter-
national Health Regulation (IHR) has been issued by the
World Health Organization (WHO). The IHR supports the
State Parties in capability building to prepare and respond
to natural, accidental and intentional spread of diseases as
well as to improve the Confidence Building Measures
information exchange process. By adoption of IHR, States
Parties become more aware of the connection between
public health and biological weapons reflecting in closer
integration of WHO and BTWC activities on biosafety,
biosecurity, disease surveillance and reporting.
Finally, environmental protection needs to be in bio-
logical safety and security concern, as well. Modern
biotechnology, including synthetic biology, -nomics sci-
ences, is an emerging instrument with potentials in
improving human and animal health, agriculture, industrial
and agricultural production as well as environmental pro-
tection. Nevertheless, the development and applications of
it may have potential side effects to human and animal
health as well as environment, counting biodiversity risks.
Regulation of modern biotechnology products ought to
safeguard the right of consumers to have access to safe
products, information about the products and live in a safe
and sustainable environment. The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety has established a legal framework for interna-
tional trade in genetically modified organism (GMOs) and
provides Signatory State Parties with orientation and the
framework for development of complementary national
biosafety regulations. It however, does not address the risks
and safe practices of handling of such organisms in dif-
ferent workplaces.
As a result, State Parties were obligated to review their
domestic legislation and/or implement an additional law(s).
National implementation of BTWC includes not only leg-
islative and administrative measures, but also actions to
enhance native compliance with the BTWC, export control
system, biological safety and security, disease surveillance,
biological agents detection, education and awareness
raising.
This publication presents information on both, interna-
tional and national biosafety and biosecurity legislation.
Status of national implementation of BTWC, penalization
issues and measures to account for and secure production,
use, storage of particularly dangerous pathogens or activ-
ities involving humans, plants and animals where infection
may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety and security
measures in laboratories including laboratory safety
equipment, personnel protective equipment, waste handling
and accident reporting have been studied. Moreover, dual-
use technology and measures of secure transport of bio-
hazard materials have been also taken into account. In
addition, genetic engineering regulations, biosecurity
activities in laboratories and code of conducts have been
investigated, as well.
European Union Regulations in Biosafety
and Biosecurity
The second, third and fourth Review Conferences noted
‘‘the importance of … legislation regarding the physical
protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unau-
thorized access to and removal of microbial or other
biological agents, or toxins’’ (Final Declaration of the
Fourth Review Conference 1996a; Final Declaration of the
Third Review Conference 1991a; Final Declaration of the
Second Review Conference 1986a). Following, the Sixth
Review Conference recognized ‘‘that states must take all
necessary safety and security provisions to protect popu-
lations and the environment when carrying out such
destruction and/or diversion’’ (Final Declaration of the
Sixth Review Conference 2006a). Moreover, the Sixth
Review Conference called ‘‘upon States Parties to adopt, in
accordance with their constitutional processes, legislative,
administrative, judicial and other measures, including
penal legislation, designed to … ensure the safety and
security of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in
laboratories, facilities, and during transportation, to prevent
unauthorized access to and removal of such agents and
toxins’’ (Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference
2006b).
Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference
calls for ‘‘need to implement safety and security measures
to protect human populations and the environment,
including animals and plants’’ in accordance to article II
(Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference
2012a), ‘‘need to ensure safety and security of microbial or
other biological agents or toxins in laboratories, facilities,
and during transportation, to prevent unauthorized access
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to and removal of such agents and toxins’’ in accordance to
article IV (Final Declaration of the Seventh Review Con-
ference 2012b). as well as ‘‘need to national
implementation measures’’ regarding standards on bio-
safety and biosecurity, awareness among relevant
professionals in public sector and sciences, promulgation
of codes of conduct, training and education programs,
capability building for surveillance and detection of out-
breaks (IHR), equipment and means of delivery control of
transport in accordance to paragraph 13 of article IV (Final
Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference 2012b). In
reference to disease surveillance and detection, the Sixth
Review Conference has previously reaffirmed that ‘‘the
commitment of State Parties to take the necessary national
measures to strengthen methods and capabilities for sur-
veillance and detection of outbreaks of disease at the
national, regional and international levels’’ (Final Decla-
ration of the Sixth Review Conference 2006c).
Referring to public, human and animal health the sec-
ond, third and fourth Review Conferences called ‘‘for
greater cooperation in international public health and dis-
ease control’’ (Final Declaration of the Second Review
Conference 1986b; Final Declaration of the Third Review
Conference 1991b; Final Declaration of the Fourth Review
Conference 1996b). The third and fourth Review Confer-
ences additionally urged ‘‘in providing information on
national epidemiological surveillance and data reporting
systems, and (…) assistance, on a bilateral level and/or in
conjunction with WHO, the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), regarding epide-
miological and epizootical surveillance, with a review to
improvements in the identification and timely reporting of
significant outbreaks of human and animal diseases’’ (Final
Declaration of the Third Review Conference 1991b; Final
Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference 1996b). The
Sixth Review Conference broadens above area calling for
disease surveillance specific for humans, animals and
plants (Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference
2006e), improvement of ‘‘communication on disease sur-
veillance at all levels’’ (Final Declaration of the Sixth
Review Conference 2006f) and ‘‘improving national and
regional capabilities to survey, detect, diagnose and combat
infectious diseases as well as other possible biological
threats and integrate these efforts into national and/or
regional emergency and disease management plans’’ (Final
Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference 2006f).
Moreover, it also calls for promotion of development and
production of vaccines and drugs used in infectious dis-
eases treatment (Final Declaration of the Sixth Review
Conference 2006d, f).
The European Union Member States in parallel with the
BTWC process have also collectively and individually
established effective regulations towards implementation
of biosafety and biosecurity.
The list of currently applicable laws and regulations
related to biosafety and biosecurity in European Union
(EU) is shown in Table 1.
Apart from legally binding agreements and legislative
measures, biorisk management standards play supportive
Table 1 European Union (EU) regulations related to biosafety and biosecurity sectors
Name Objectives
Directive 89/391/EEC, 12 June 1989 Introduces measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at
work
Directive 89/656/EEC, 30 November 1989 Provides minimum health and safety requirements for the use by workers of personal
protective equipment at the workplace
Council directive 90/220/EEC, 3 April 1990 On the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs
Council directive 90/219/EEC, 23 April 1990 On the contained use of GMMs
Council directive 90/679/EEC, 26 November 1990 On the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at
work. Requires manufacturers, importers, distributors and suppliers to provide
safety data sheets for microorganisms (Directive 90/679/EEC has been repealed in
September 2000 by Directive 2000/54/EC)
Council regulation 2309/93/EEC, 26 July 1993 Lays down community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal
products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products
Council directive 93/88/EEC, 12 October 1993 Amends Council Directive 90/679/EEC on the protection of workers from risks
related to exposure to biological agents at work to technical progress
Council directive 93/75/EC, 13 September 1993 Establishes minimum requirements for vessels bound for or leaving Community ports
and carrying dangerous or polluting goods
Commission directive 94/51/EEC, 7 November 1994 Amends council directive 90/219/EEC to technical progress on the contained use of
GMOs




Commission directive 94/3/EC, 21 January 1994 Establishes procedures for the notification of interception of a consignment or a
harmful organism from third countries and presenting an imminent phytosanitary
danger
Commission decision 94/730/EEC, 4 November 1994 Establishes simplified procedures on the deliberate release of genetically modified
plants into the environment
Council directive 94/55/EC, 21 November 1994 On the approximation of the laws of the Member States on the transport of dangerous
goods by road
Council decision 94/942 CFSP, 19 December 1994 On the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J 3 of the Treaty on
EU on export controls of dual use of goods
Council regulation 94/3381/EC, 19 December 1994 On a community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology
Council directive 95/44/EC, 26 July 1995 Establishes the conditions under which certain harmful organisms, plants, plant
products and other objects listed in Annexes I to V of Council Directive 77/93/EEC
may be introduced into or moved within the Community for trial or scientific
purposes
Council directive 95/44/EC, 25 July 1995 Establishes the conditions under which certain harmful organisms, plants, plant
products and other objects listed in Annexes I to V to Council Directive 77/93/EEC
may be introduced into or moved within the Community or certain protected zones
thereof, for trial or scientific purposes and for work on varietal selections
Commission directive 95/30/EC, 30 June 1995 Adapts council directive 90/679/EEC on the protection of workers from risks related
to exposure to biological agents at work to technical progress
Council directive 96/49/EC, 23 July 1996 On the approximation of laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of
dangerous goods by rail
Council common position 96/408/CFSP, 25 June 1996 Relates to preparation for the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on the
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BTWC)
Council decision 96/613/CFSP, 22 October 1996 Amends decision 94/942/CFSP on the joint action adopted by the Council on the
control of exports of dual-use goods. Contains the list of dual-use goods subject to
controls within the EU
Commission directive 96/87/EC, 13 December 1996 Adapts to technical progress Council Directive 96/49/EC on the approximation of the
laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by rail
Commission directive 96/39/EC, 19 June 1996 Amends council directive 93/75/EEC concerning minimum requirements for vessels
bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods
Council directive 97/35/EC Amends Council directive 90/220/EC on deliberate release into the environment of
GMOs
Commission directive 97/59/EC, 7 October 1997 Adapts Council directive 90/679/EEC on the protection of workers from risks related
to exposure to biological agents at work to technical progress
Commission directive 97/65/EC, 26 November 1997 Adapts Council directive 90/679/EEC on the protection of workers from risks related
to exposure to biological agents at work to technical progress
Commission directive 97/34/EC, 6 June 1997 Amends Council directive 93/75/EEC concerning minimum requirements for vessels
bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods
Commission directive 97/35/EC of 18 June 1997 Updating Council directive 90/220/EEC on the deliberate release into the environment
of GMO’s
Council directive 98/55/EC, 17 July 1998 Amends Council directive 93/75EEC concerning minimum requirements for vessels
bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods
Commission directive 98/74/EC, 1 October 1998 Amends Council directive 93/75EEC concerning minimum requirements for vessels
bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods
Council common position 98/197/CFSP, 4 March 1998 Promotes the early and successful conclusions of Ad Hoc Group negotiations and
requires member States to continue to promote universality of the Convention
Council directive 98/81/EC, 26 October 1998 Amends directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of GMOs. Requires Member
States to take all appropriate measures to avoid adverse effects of GMOs and carry
out a risk assessment before release into the environment
Council joint action 1999/878/CFSP, 17 December 1999 Establishes a cooperative program for non-proliferation and disarmament in the
Russian Federation
Council common position 1999/346/CFSP, 17 May 1999 Relates to progress towards a legally binding Protocol to strengthen compliance with
the BTWC and with a view to the successful completion of substantive work in the
Ad Hoc Group by the end of 1999
Council directive 2000/54/EC, 18 September 2000 On the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at
work
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role, as well. Standards are kind of declaration of intention,
code of conduct or guidance for good practice in particular
area. Standards are based on existing international norms
(WHO) and national/regional (EU) legislations. They are
developed with the help of Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions dealing with topic issues directly (WHO, FAO, OIE,
etc.) as well as authorizing institutions like European
Committee for Standardization and International Organi-
zation for Standardization. Standards developed for
biosafety and biosecurity management need to be appli-
cable for governmental and private institutions and
following, being a helpful tool for State Parties for more
effectively implementation of the BTWC obligations.
List of the most important standards in biosafety and
biosecurity fields is presented in Table 2.
National Implementation
In accordance to BTWC, biosafety and biosecurity need to
cover measures to account for and secure production, use,
storage and transport of highly dangerous pathogens and
Table 1 continued
Name Objectives
Council directive 2000/29/EC, 8 May 2000 On protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms
harmful to plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community
Council regulation no. 1334/2000 Article 4 extends to items which become subject to export controls if they are
intended in their entirely or in part for particular end uses including in connection
with the development, production, handling, operation, maintenance, storage,
detection, identification, or dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons
Council directive 2000/29/EC, 8 May 2000 On protective measures against introduction into the Community of organisms
harmful to plants or plant products and their spread within the Community
Council directive 2001/83/EC, 6 November 2001 On the community code to medicinal products for human use
Council common position 2001/931CFSP, 21 December 2001 Establishes a list of suspected terrorists, defines terrorism to include those who
manufacture, acquire, possess, transport, acquire, supply or use WMD. Requires
Member States through police and judicial cooperation to assist each other in
preventing and combating terrorist acts
Council directive 2001/82/EC, 6 November 2001 On the community code to veterinary medicinal products
Council directive 2001/18/EC, 12 March 2001 On the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs and repealing Council
Directive 90/220/EEC. Establishes a regulatory framework for work on and release
of GMOs. Provides risk assessment criteria and emergency response
Council regulation 2001/2432/EC, 20 November 2001 On a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology
Council regulation 2002/880/EC, 27 May 2002 On a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology
Council decision 2002/381/CFSP, 21 May 2002 Implements joint Action 1999/878/CFSP with a view to contributing to the EU
cooperation program for non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian
Federation
Council common position 2002/976/CFSP, 12 December 2002 Most recent amendment of 2002/931/CFSP and its list, contained in the Annex. Also
repeals the previous amendment 2002/847/CFSP
Council regulation 149/2003/EC, 27 January 2003 Amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology
EC regulation 1504/2004 Includes exceptions from licensing and inclusions of technologies
Council regulation (EC) No 394/2006 of 27 February 2006 Amends and updates Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime
for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology
EC regulation number 450/2008 To establish a modern customs code
Council joint action 2008/307/CFSP To support WHO activities in the area of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in the
framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD
Commission directive 2009/41/EC On the contained use of GMOs (this new Directive repeals Directive 90/219/EEC and
its successive amendments Directive 94/51/EC, Directive 98/81/EC and Decision
2001/204/EC)
EC regulation number 428/2009 Sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit
of dual-use items
EC communication COM(2009)273 On strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security, which
includes a proposal for an EU CBRN Action Plan
Based on National Implementation Database, EU section 2013
GMOs Genetically modified organisms, GMMs genetically modified microorganisms, WMD weapon of mass destruction, CBRN chemical
biological radiological nuclear threats
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Table 2 International standards related to biosafety and biosecurity sectors (some of these are national (CDC) or multinational (CWA))
Name Objectives
Guidance on regulations for the transport of infectious
substances 2013–2014, WHO/HSE/GCR/2012.12
Legislation, classification of infectious substances, preparation of shipments for
transport, packaging, labeling and documentation requirements for infectious
substances in category A and B, overpacks, reusing and shipping empty packaging,
refrigeration, training, transport planning, procedures, incident reporting
Biosafety professional competence CEN CWA
16335:2011
Biological hazards, environment (working), laboratories, personnel, management,
training, courses, education, examination (education), risk assessment, safety
measures, occupational safety
UN regulations on transport of dangerous goods These regulations also describe guidelines and regulations of transportation of
dangerous pathogens
Laboratory biorisk management standard CWA
15793:2011
Biorisk management system: biorisk policy, planning (hazard identification, risk
assessment, risk control), implementation and operation (responsibilities and
authorities, personnel training, awareness and competence, consultation and
communication, operational control, work practices, personnel protection, waste
management, worker health program, infrastructure, transport of biological agents
and toxin, personal security), emergency response and contingency plans, checking
and corrective actions (data analysis, inventory monitoring and control, accident/
incident investigation and preventive actions)
Responsible life sciences research for global health
security, WHO guidance, 2010
WHA55.16 and the biorisk management framework for responsible life sciences
research (research excellence, ethics, biosafety and laboratory biosecurity), self-
assessment questionnaire
Bioterrorism incident pre-planning and response guide,
second edition, INTERPOL, 2010
CBRNE threats, biological agents, overt and covert attacks, preparedness and
operational response for bioterrorism
Natural ventilation for infection control in health-care
settings, WHO guideline, 2009
Definition of ventilation, requirements for natural ventilation, describing the basic
principles of design, construction, operation and maintenance for an effective natural
ventilation system to control infection in health-care settings
Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical
laboratories, CDC, 2009
Biological risk assessment (biological agents, laboratory procedures, work practices),
biosafety (safety equipment, facility design and construction, animal facilities,
clinical labs, shipment infectious materials), laboratory biosafety level criteria,
vivarium biosafety level criteria, laboratory biosecurity, occupational health and
immunoprophylaxis, containment for biohazards, decontamination, disinfection,
agriculture pathogen biosafety
Green paper on bio-preparedness, EC, 2007 Key principles of bio-preparedness (prevention, protection, security issues related to
biological research, public and animal health surveillance, response and recovery)
A code of conduct for biosecurity––reported by the
Biosecurity Working Group, 2008
Biological weapons, dual use, threat analysis, life sciences and biological weapons,
existing legislation, implementation and compliance with code of conduct
Biorisk management––laboratory biosecurity guidance,
WHO/CDS/EPR, 2006
Laboratory biosecurity as a complement to laboratory biosafety, biorisk management,
countering biorisks, laboratory biosecurity programme
Biological incident response and environmental
sampling (European guideline on principles of field
investigation), 2006
Field investigation (attack stages, biological agents, delivery devices, incident types),
mission planning, arrival on scene, sampling strategy, safety (environmental, FIT),
assessment and crime scene search
International Health Regulation, WHO, 2005 Foster global partnerships, national disease prevention, surveillance, control and
response systems, public health security in travel and transport, strengthen WHO
global alert and response systems and management of specific risks, obligations and
procedures
Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition, WHO,
2004
Microbiological risk assessment, biosafety levels 1–4 (code of practice, lab design and
facilities, lab equipment, health and medical surveillance, training, waste handling,
chemical, fire, electrical, radiation and equipment safety), laboratory animal facilities
levels 1–4, laboratory equipment, good microbiological techniques, biosafety and
recombinant DNA technology, safety organization and training, safety checklist
Public health response to biological and chemical
weapons, WHO guidance, 2001
Assessing the threat to public health, biological and chemical agents, public health
preparedness for biological or chemical incidents and response, legal aspects,
international sources of assistance
Guidelines for the collection of clinical specimens
during field investigation of outbreaks, WHO/CDS/
CSR/EDC/2000.4
Planning and processing for specimen collection, storage, packaging and transport of
specimens
CEN European committee for standardization, CDC US centers for disease control and prevention, CWA communications workers of America,
CBRNE chemical biological radiological nuclear explosive threats
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toxins or activities connecting humans, plants or animals
where infection or intoxication may pose a risk. Moreover,
procedures relating licensing, safety and security measures
for laboratories, laboratory containment measures and
genetic engineering regulations need to be engaged, as
well.
The national implementation of each State Party is
essential to enforce the provisions of the BTWC, namely,
prohibition and prevention of development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer or use of bio-
logical weapons by any person under their domestic
jurisdiction. Furthermore, each country is obligated to
implement additional measures into the current valid leg-
islation to more preferably protect and prevent
encouraging, inciting or assisting others.
National implementation of BTWC has been approved
in most European countries so far, and determines the
measures to account for and secure production, use and
storage particularly dangerous pathogens or activities
involving humans, plants or animals where infection may
pose a risk (BTWC Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013).
Penalization
The penalization measures related to biological safety and
security are implemented in the national BTWC regula-
tions. Countries without national implementation of BTWC
regulate penalization issues fragmentarily by national
Penal Codes, e.g., in section on penalization of crimes
against international law (BTWC Legislation Database,
VERTIC 2013).
Protection of Employees Working with Biological
Agents
Directive 2000/54/EC is the most important in protection
of workers from risks related to exposure to biological
agents at work.
National regulations on protection of employees work-
ing with biological agents have been implemented in most
of the European countries (BTWC Legislation Database,
VERTIC 2013). Austria regulate this issue by the Ordi-
nance on protection of employees against hazards caused
by biological agents, the Ordinance on work with GMOs in
contained use (analogical ordinance applies in Switzer-
land), Law on the protection of employees, Regulation on
biological work material and Regulation on safety of
workplace (the last is similar to Ireland regulation). In
Germany, apart from the Ordinance on safety and health
protection at work involving biological agents, Technical
Regulations for Biological Agents and Labour Protection
Act are valid. The Royal Decree on protection of
employees working with biological agents has been issued
in Belgium. Comparable Decree on protection of employ-
ees’ health at work is valid in Czech Republic and France.
In France, the Work Code that affects the use of biohazards
as well as Order on health and safety signs at work has
been additionally implemented. The objectives of Directive
2000/54/EC have been implemented also in Swedish,
British and Norwegian national regulations. Provisions of
Directive 2000/54/EC introduces into Polish law the Min-
ister of Health of 22 April 2005 the harmful biological
agents for health in the workplace and protection of the
health of workers occupationally exposed to these factors.
Simultaneously, the Labour Code requires the employer to
evaluate and document the occupational risks associated
with performed work, the use of the necessary preventive
measures to reduce risk and to inform employees about the
occupational risk that is associated with their daily work,
and the principles of risk protection. Labour Codes in
Belarus and Kazakhstan as well as the Labour Regulation
Act in Macedonia regulate some aspects of above Direc-
tive. In Moldova, some obligations of Directive 2000/54/
EC are implemented in Law on Biosecurity; nevertheless,
it is mainly related to GMOs and GMO products.
Genetic Engineering
Directive 2009/41/EC (repealing and replacing Directive
90/219/EEC and 98/81/EC) is the most important in con-
tained use of genetically modified microorganisms
(GMMs).
Austria, Ireland, Moldova, Germany, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden and UK have implemented obligations of
Directive 2009/41/EC in national regulations (BTWC
Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013). In general, con-
tained use of non-GM pathogenic microorganisms has not
been taken into account. In Switzerland, the handling of
GMOs is governed by the Gene Technology Law, while the
handling of non-GM pathogenic organisms is governed by
the Federal Laws on Epidemics and Environmental Pro-
tection. The Ordinance on the contained use of organisms
of 25 August 1999 (as of 23 November 1999) regulates the
contained use of organisms, in particular genetically
modified or pathogenic organisms.
Waste Management
Waste management is regulated in almost all European
countries as separate legal act (France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Poland, Turkey,
Spain, Macedonia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
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Moldova). In Belgium and France, the Directive 98/81/EC
is implemented into national legislation. In France,
requirements of above Directive are completed by specific
regulations on waste originating from medical care and
dangerous waste in general, imposing rules for storage, for
incineration and for collection by an approved company.
The Netherlands implements Directive 2008/98/EC. Some
countries implement both, GMOs and GMO products waste
as well as contained material management as an annex to
currently applicable law or code (Czech Republic, Swe-
den). The Albanian Law of Environmental Protection
regulates the management of hazardous waste and dan-
gerous matters. In Croatia are applicable both, the
Regulation on Categories, Types and Classification of
Waste with a Waste Catalogue and List of Hazardous
Waste and Regulation on supervision of transboundary
movement of waste (BTWC Legislation Database, VER-
TIC 2013).
Handling of Laboratory Animals
National legislation concerning laboratory animal handling
is neglected in almost all European countries. In France
applies the Order of 19 April 1988 setting out conditions for
the provision to accredited laboratories of animals used for
purposes of experimental and scientific research, setting out
conditions for issuing authorizations to conduct animal
experiments, and setting out conditions for accreditation,
fitting out and operation of animal experimentation estab-
lishments. Some elements including isolation or removal of
sick animals, disinfection, safety lodge of the animal car-
casses, rendering and other wastes, in an approved place,
safety lodge or sanitary treatment of the excrement as well as
elimination of transmission vectors of the contagious dis-
eases and safety handling of animal cadavers are regulated
by national legislations concerning veterinary service and
inspectorate (e.g., Albania). Other elements are regulated in
Law on health and well-being of animals (e.g., the Nether-
lands) (BTWC Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013).
Reporting of Accidents
In general, reporting of incidents and accidents in labora-
tories is included in national ordinances, acts and
regulations (Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal,
United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine,
Macedonia, Kazakhstan). In some countries, this aspect is
specifically related to GMO and GMO products, e.g.,
Austrian Ordinance on Work with GMOs in Contained Use
regulates safety aspects and the measures to be taken in
case of accidents. A Czech Republic Law Act on GMO
Products covers accident reporting in Article 20 and 21,
concerning, respectively, emergency response plan and
measures taken in case of an accident. Nevertheless, no
uniform mechanism to report on incidents/accidents in
European countries has been established. Some legal acts
mention about necessity of it, but do not provide detailed
information how to do it or provide only overall informa-
tion (BTWC Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013).
Laboratory Measures Related to Biosafety
and Biosecurity
Legal obligation on Standard Operational Procedures is
applicable in many countries in relation to biological safety
and security. In general, procedures and Good Laboratory
Practice issues are within responsibility of directors and
supervisors of the laboratories as occupational safety and
health rules.
Transportation of Biological Agents
National measures to account for and secure transport of
particularly dangerous pathogens or activities involving
humans, plants or animals where infection may pose a risk
have been analyzed. Most of the European countries have
applicable regulation concerning transport of dangerous
goods (Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Bulgaria,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Spain, Latvia, Mace-
donia, Moldova, Liechtenstein, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Russian Federation, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic,
Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Iceland, Lithuania, Monte-
negro, Andorra). Some countries have also implemented
Law on transportation of hazardous goods (e.g., Switzer-
land) or both (e.g., UK, Czech Republic) (BTWC
Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013).
Dual-Use Technology
National Act implemented Council Regulation (EC) No
428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items
which is directly applicable in all EU countries (Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden, UK) (BTWC Legislation Database,
VERTIC 2013). Candidate countries for EU membership
are Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.
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Biosecurity Measures
Only three European countries have a Law on Biosecurity
(Sweden, Moldova, Turkey), but in general it is focused on
GMOs and GMO products. The physical containment of
laboratories is dedicated particularly to GMOs. Law on
national security of Romania covers overall issues. Exec-
utive Order on securing specific biological substances,
delivery systems and related material is applicable in
Denmark. Legal requirements to impose secure storage and
use of dangerous pathogens and toxins are listed in Sche-
dule 5 of Part 7 of the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 and the Security of Pathogens and Toxins
(Exceptions to Dangerous Substances Regulations 2002) in
UK (BTWC Legislation Database, VERTIC 2013).
No EU level legislation exists that has been specifically
developed to address the protection of biological agents in
the laboratory from loss or misuse, thus, biosecurity aspect
is in principle neglected. Nevertheless, due to many syn-
ergies between biosafety and biosecurity, the EU
Directives developed to protect workers from exposure to
biological agents or GMMs address most of the issues
related to laboratory biosecurity. Overall, competences
and responsibilities of persons responsible for biosafety
and biosecurity are fragmentarily defined. Licensing staffs
to authorized access to the laboratory is neglected in most
countries. Many institutions implement some biosecurity
controls, but these are often focused on physical security.
Less attention is focused on information security or
organizational security issues, despite the fact that internal
threats from individuals with authorized access to the
laboratory must be recognized.
Bioethics
In most of the European countries, national code of ethics
for scientific research or codes of bioethics is applied, e.g.,
Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Ireland, Latvia,
Germany, UK, Switzerland, Italy. In Italy, additionally the
Conduct for Biosecurity has been implemented in 2010.
Other countries use manuals or guides, e.g., Good Practice
for Scientific Research and Good Manners in Science
issued by the Polish Academy of Science.
Conclusion
In general, most of the biosafety and biosecurity aspects
are covered independently in national laws, procedures and
on technical and physical measures related to human, plant
and animal pathogens. Based on the national legislation
review, risk management is better documented for GMOs
than for native pathogens. There is lack of legislative
unification in GMOs and pathogenic agents. Usually, the
GMOs regulation covers biosafety and biosecurity issues
only in relation to GMOs and GMO products.
Still applicable becomes a need for global unification of
national regulations in biosafety and biosecurity fields
(Stavskiy et al. 2003).
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